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Abstract 
The extractive sector is increasingly important in the GDP and export basket of the four Andean countries under 
study (ACs) (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia). The analysis of an updated inventory of 296 environmental 
conflicts in the EJAtlas for these four countries reaches the following conclusions: extractivism causes 
environmental conflicts related to mining, fossil fuels, hydropower and biomass; indigenous, Afro-descendant and 
peasant communities are the most affected; behind the conflicts, there are not only environmental impacts but also 
social impacts that concern livelihoods, land deprivation and work insecurity, and also loss of cultural practices and 
cultural identity; most of the forms of collective action used in protests are peaceful, most notably petitions, street 
marches, media activism, lawsuits, while States and companies criminalize activists and are often violent (with about 
75 cases in which there are deaths or disappearance of environmental defenders); socio-environmental movements 
(that sometimes include environmental NGOs) have achieved relative success, stopping 59 of the 296 conflict-
generating projects and giving birth to new forms of resistance. While successfully stopping single projects cannot be 
construed as a general critique of economic growth, such attempts are congruent with post-development, community-
centric, ecologically-balanced and culturally-sensitive Andean visions such as buen vivir or sumak kawsay. They are 
also congruent with policy proposals put forward from a post-economic growth perspective such as “leaving 
unburnable fuels in the ground” and “resource extraction caps”.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Our purpose is to reach conclusions from the analysis of many cases of environmental conflicts in 
the Andean countries in a framework of comparative, statistical political ecology drawing from 
three main concepts in ecological economics: “social metabolism”, “ecological distribution 
conflicts” and “valuation languages”. We delve beneath the surface manifestations of 
environmental conflicts related to mineral ores, hydroelectric dams, public infrastructures, 
biomass or fossil fuels extraction in order to uncover their material causes in the growth and 
changes in the social metabolism accompanied by changes in public policies and trends of the 
world economy. In Latin America (LA) and the Andean countries (ACs), a process known as 
reprimarization or neo-extractivism has grown in the last decades (Acosta-Medina, 2011, Azamar, 
2017; Gudynas, 2009, 2010, 2013; Lander, 2014; Nadal, 2009; Slipak, 2013; Vallejo, 2010). As a 
consequence, there have been increased collective disputes over territorial rights, pollution and 
loss of ecosystems services.  
 
Ecological distribution conflicts is a type of social conflicts not co-terminous with economic 
distribution conflicts on salaries vs. profits, land rents, prices of agricultural products, interest 
rates paid by debtors to creditors. In Ecological Distribution Conflicts (Martinez-Alier 1995, 
Martinez-Alier and O’Connor 1996), which is being distributed are the burdens of pollution and 
the access to natural resources and ecosystem services. Complaints on ecological distribution are 
often expressed in valuation languages (Martinez-Alier 2002) different from economic 
compensation for damages. Thus, in gold mining in Latin America complaints against water 
grabbing and water pollution are often expressed in the grassroots aphorism El agua vale más que 
el oro, meaning “water is more valuable than gold”. What is meant is not that 1 kg of water is 
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more expensive in money terms than 1 kg of gold but that water is more valuable than gold in 
other standards of value.  
 
Primary specialization has generated a large literature in LA on the accumulation of capital based 
on the exploitation of natural resources, which has been denoted by various terms, including 
reprimarization, deindustrialization, extractivism and neo-extractivism. Reprimarization is 
understood as the reorientation of an economy’s resources or productive profile towards 
predominantly primary-extractive activities with reduced added economic value (Slipak, 2014).   
 
Reprimarization rejects the possibility of establishing one long-term scheme for the consolidation 
of those productive lines in which a country could become competitive through a dynamic 
process (Schuldt, 1994). In the name of "comparative advantages”, specialization in primary 
producers is promoted, increasing environmental pressures (Pérez-Rincón, 2006, 2008). The 
volume of exported primary products increases, and structurally their prices are low compared to 
imported products. As often discussed in ecological economics, there is ecologically unequal 
exchange (Hornborg, 1998, Pérez Rincón, 2006, Hornborg and Martinez-Alier, 2016, Samaniego 
et al 2017). In the present article our focus is on the local effects and struggles around 
“extractivism” rather than on national policies to cope with negative terms of trade.  
 
Recently, several authors note that from the 1990s on, AC and South America as a whole 
deepened the trend towards an extractivist or neo-extractivist model (Gudynas, 2009, 2013; 
Svampa, 2012; Acosta-Espinosa, 2012), applied by both “neoliberal” governments (such as in 
Colombia and Peru) and by “nationalist-popular governments” (such as those of Ecuador and 
Bolivia). The term "extractivism" can refer to all types of economic activities involving the 
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extraction of natural resources (Gudynas, 2013), including sectors such as mining, forestry, 
fisheries, the agro-industrial sector and infrastructure projects. Some activities transform the 
environment moderately, whereas others alter it beyond ecological and social thresholds 
(Sarmiento et al. 2017). In Ecuador and Bolivia there was a progressive “neo-extractivism" 
(Gudynas, 2009), allowing for a more active role of the State through greater control over natural 
resources and the benefits of their extraction. These activities finance social programs, ensuring 
new sources of social legitimacy and situating extractivism as an essential means for combating 
poverty and promoting “development”. However, many of the pathologies of traditional or neo-
liberal extractivism (as in Colombia and Peru) are maintained in progressive neo-extractivism. 
 
Regardless of their name, economic activities linked to the extraction and commercialization of 
natural resources with little added value and emphasizing the external market are linked to large 
social and environmental unpaid liabilities. As argued elsewhere in this issue (Abulut et al, 2018) 
the common ground that conjoins post-growth (or degrowth) and environmental justice is not 
merely a call for a reduction in social metabolism. It is also the pursuit of internal and 
international socio-ecological justice. Communities living at the commodity extraction frontiers 
lose ways and means of life, social networks, cultural structures and their customary rights over 
the common goods upon which they depend, and they complain accordingly in an 
“environmentalism of the poor and the indigenous” (Martinez-Alier, 2002). The expansion of the 
frontier often includes territories with great wealth in ecosystem services such as páramos, 
wetlands, tropical forests, mangroves, etc., which is why many environmental groups and 
institutions seek to defend those territories. 
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Externalities (which are more accurately seen as systematic “cost-shifting”, Kapp, 1950) are 
generated by changes in land use, the introduction of new extractive activities, changes in 
production technologies, the expansion of economic frontiers. This process contradicts the 
property rights, usufructs, activities pursuant to which these geographical spaces have been used 
by the local communities which become victims of the “coloniality of power” (Quijano, A., M. 
Ennis, 2000) and of “environmental racism” (Bullard, 1983, 1990).   
 
Such conflicts can be seen as the manifestation of social contradictions in the human-nature 
relationship between two or more actors (communities, national private companies, foreign 
companies, non-governmental organization or the State) because of human activity that modifies 
the conditions of a place in terms of use of the environment. Such changes generate 
nonconformities that are manifested through vocabularies of protest or repertoires of collective 
actions of rejection such as marches, blockades, lawsuits, petitions to the authorities, etc. 
 
The mobilized groups put forward different arguments that seek the conservation or preservation 
of nature and also the conservation of ethical, cultural and aesthetic values in their relationship 
with the natural environment, and the consideration of the environment as a provider of 
livelihoods for communities. In well known cases in Colombia and Ecuador, local indigenous 
communities (the U’Wa, the Sarayaku) anticipated the calls to “leave oil in the soil” or, 
equivalently, to leave the “unburnable fuels” underground. This became public policy for six 
years in Ecuador with the Yasuni ITT proposal, 2007-2013 (Vallejo et al, 2015). As we shall see 
below, there are currently many attempts in AC to stop mining and hydropower projects, and also 
oil palm plantations. Environmental conflicts lose their local character, generating a vast global 
movement for environmental justice (and for a less unsustainable economy) through participation 
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in networks that seek to visibilize and resist on broader territorial scales (Scheidel et al, 2018; 
Martinez-Alier, Temper, Del Bene, & Scheidel, 2016; Temper, Del Bene, & Martinez-Alier, 
2015; Pérez-Rincón et al, 2018) developing a whole new vocabulary of environmental justice 
(Martinez-Alier et al, 2014). The EJAtlas itself (see below) is a product of this global movement 
for environmental justice and seeks to support it.  
  
This article aims mainly to characterize the conflicts in the AC region, focusing on four countries 
only (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia). It is structured as follows. After this introduction, 
the methodology used to identify the extractivist process is presented in both chrematistic 
(monetary) and metabolic terms; evidence of conflicts will then be drawn from the EJAtlas for 
the four Andean economies studied. Then, the results of the analysis of conflicts, the discussion 
and the conclusions are presented. 
 
2.  MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
For the analysis of productive specialization and environmental conflicts in ACs, both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies were used. Two major activities were performed: the 
construction of a database that includes economic and metabolic flow information and the 
inventory of environmental conflicts in the region. 
 
Monetary statistics were taken from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) for the period 1990-2014. For the Material Flow database (MFA), the 
methodology developed by EUROSTAT (2013) was used. We worked with three extensive 
indicators: Direct Material Input (DMI), domestic extraction (DE) and material exports (X). The 
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DMI (DE + M) corresponds to all materials extracted from the national territory (DE) plus 
imports (M). All materials are measured in physical units of weight (Metric Tons), classifying 
them into biomass, mineral ores, building materials and fossil fuels. Based on the DMI, two 
intensive indicators were constructed: Intensity per capita (DMI /pop), which corresponds to the 
environmental pressure per inhabitant; and (DMI/km 2), which relates the flow of materials and 
the land surface of the region to km2 (Vallejo et al, 2011, Krausmann et al, 2015, Vallejo et al 
2015). 
 
The inventory of environmental conflicts for the ACs under study was obtained from the Atlas of 
Environmental Justice (www.ejatlas.org), which started in 2014 with 920 cases and has reached 
2500 cases worldwide by July 2018. The 296 conflicts analyzed in this article (Colombia: 122, 
Ecuador: 58, Peru: 76, and Bolivia: 40) were reported by researchers at Univalle (co-authors of 
this article) and also by various environmental NGOs, social activists, and academic groups and 
researchers, and collected in the EJAtlas. The process of building up the EJAtlas (filling in the 5 
or 6 pages database forms, “moderating” the cases by revising the descriptions, checking the facts 
and sources, and in some cases updating the information) implies at least two or three days of 
work per case. The database forms have been filled in by teams of two or three persons with final 
moderation by the ICTA UAB group. The OCMAL inventory of mining conflicts of Latin 
America was used in the first years of this process, as also information from Oilwatch and other 
sources (such as Latorre et al 2015 for Ecuador, Raquel Neyra for Peru, 2017). (More details on 
the methodology of the EJAtlas are in Temper, Del Bene and Martinez-Alier, 2015)3. 
                                                        
3 An alternative way to understand the relationships between social metabolism and environmental conflicts could 
incorporate other, more complete methodological developments such as the Multi-scale integrated analysis of 
societal and ecosystem metabolism (MuSIASEM) (Giampietro, Mayumi, Ramos-Martín, 2009). On the relations 
between MF and Musiasem, cf. the article by Gerber and Scheidel (2018) .  
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Information about the conflict cases comes from public institutions, local activist groups, 
academics, companies’ websites, and blogs, magazines and newspapers. Sources are quoted in 
the database forms, which are publicly available (www.ejatlas.org). The EJAtlas can be described 
as a large, purposive, expert-elicited sample of recent, visible, previously reported ecological 
distribution conflicts from around the world, with still uneven geographical coverage. The AC are 
well represented. Each database form contains the name and location of the conflict, a general 
description, and many coded variables on the commodities in question, the environmental, health 
and socio-economic impacts, the social actors and their forms of mobilization, and the outcomes 
of the conflicts. The forms also have a section on sources of information, and links to 
photographs and videos. The total number of environmental conflicts in the AC or in the world is 
of course not known. The EJAtlas is a growing incomplete inventory of relevant, conspicuous 
conflicts. It allows research on comparative political ecology that goes much beyond the single 
case study or the comparisons between two or three case studies as it is often practiced in 
political ecology. 
 
Conflicts arise because of the growth and changes in the Social Metabolism, measured in this 
article in terms of Material Flows. Even a non-growing industrial economy would require new 
supplies of fossil fuels and other materials from the commodity extraction frontiers because 
energy is not recycled and materials are recycled only in part. The economy is not circular, it is 
entropic. There are therefore many resource extraction and waste disposal conflicts. Research 
based on the EJAtlas allows the analysis of resistance movements born from such conflicts and 
the networks they form across borders. The EJAtlas help to provide some answers to questions 
such as: Who are the social actors and victims in such conflicts, the vocabularies of protest and 
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the forms of mobilization and repression, the variables explaining the rates of “success” in 
achieving environmental justice and creating new alternatives? 
 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 ECONOMIC AND METABOLIC DYNAMICS OF ANDEAN COUNTRIES 
 
Under the impetus of static comparative advantages and internal and external policy decisions, 
ACs emphasized their specialization in the production and export of natural-intensive goods. In 
monetary terms, and at the aggregate level of the four countries analyzed, the primary sector went 
from representing 64% of all exports in 1990 to 73% in 2014. This increase can be attributed 
partly to a decline in the share of manufactured goods, which went from representing 20% to 
12%; that is, whereas additional value was once added to raw materials, now they are exported 
raw (CEPALSTAT, 2015). 
 
The sectorial structure of the GDP of ACs also shows an increase in the primary sector since 
1997, from 14 to 24% in 2014 (CEPALSTAT, 2015). This growth of primary GDP is attributable 
to the dynamics of the mining-energy sector, which changed the internal structure of the primary 
sector. Within the primary sector, whereas mining and energy grew its share of primary GDP 
from 54 to 74%, agricultural activity fell from 46 to 26%. This structural change also revealed a 
substantial de-industrialization process in ACs, reducing participation by the industrial sectors 
from 21 to 13% of GDP between 1990 and 2014 (CEPALSTAT, 2015).   
 
In metabolic terms, Figure 1 shows the consolidated DMI of the ACs between 1970 and 2012 
detailing each of the categories of domestic extraction (DE) and imports (M). In this period, the 
 10 
DMI of the region increased from 342 million tons (MT) to 1,215 MT, with a growth of 3.1% 
annual average. Regarding the structure of the DMI, the majority is conformed by the Domestic 
Extraction (DE), which grew at an annual average of 3%. Although the weight of imports 
increased, their share remains small, from 1.7% of DMI in 1970 to 5.7% in 2012, showing the 
effect of the economic opening of the 1990s.  
 
The domestic extraction (DE) of AC changed its internal structure in the period evaluated (Figure 
1). The biotic sector that occupied 65% of extraction in 1970, fell to 30% in 2012. On the other 
hand, the abiotic sector increased its participation from 35 to 70%. The components that 
experienced the highest growth were minerals in general, which increased from 28 to 51%. 
Metallic and building materials that doubled their participation stand out, reaching 27% and 24%, 
respectively, in 2012; metallic materials are for export while building materials are mostly related 
to construction for the domestic market. The extraction of fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal) also 
increased from 7 to 18.5%. This is explained by the behavior of Colombia and Ecuador; the 
former increased extraction from 16 MT to 159 MT (coal and oil) and the second increased 
extraction from 1 MT to 28 MT (oil). When exports are examined, they grew at an average 
annual rate of 5.2%, above the growth of DMI and DE. These include fossil fuels and minerals 




Figure 1.  Direct Material Input (DMI) Four Andean countries (1970-2012) 
Source: MESOCA-ANCA Project (UNIVALLE) - EJATLAS (ICTA-UAB) 
 
 
There was “absolute materialization” and an increase in the scale of the Andean economies. The 
environmental pressures are reflected in the physical pressure on the territory (DMI/km 2), which 
increased almost four-fold from 90.4 tons/km2 to 321.2 tons/km2 between 1970 and 2012. 
Growth occurred also with per capita material intensity (DMI/pc), which increased from 7.6 to 
11.7 tons/pc. 
  
3.2  THE CHARACTERIZATION OF ECOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION CONFLICTS 
IN ANDEAN COUNTRIES 
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58 in Ecuador, 76 in Peru and 40 in Bolivia (see Figure 2) which is roughly in proportion to the 
respective populations. Environmental conflicts are characterized according to the following 
topics: metabolic sectors, social impacts, affected groups, forms of mobilization, the repertoire of 
actions deployed in conflicts, and the outcomes of conflicts, including triumphs of environmental 
justice.   
 
Figure 2. Map of environmental conflicts in the Andean countries  




3.2.1 Metabolic sectors generate conflicts 
 
When analyzing conflicts according to the metabolic sectors (Figure 3), we see that 37% of such 
conflicts relate to mining (111 cases). This sector is the largest generator of conflicts in Peru, 
Colombia and Bolivia, where they account for 58, 34 and 33%, respectively, of total reported 
conflicts. In Ecuador, mining is the third most common source of environmental conflicts, 
causing 21% of the reported cases (Figure 4), likely to grow in the next years. In Peru, large 
mining projects such as Yanacocha and Conga (gold mines), and Antamina, Tía María, Las 
Bambas (copper) stand out as generators of environmental conflict. In Colombia, mining conflict 
is expressed over legal, large-scale and foreign-owned mining (promoted since the end of the 
1990s) and also on illegal mining in various areas that is prosecuted by the authorities4. In Bolivia, 
the conflicts of San Bartolomé and San Cristóbal in the department of Potosí are notable. These 
conflicts have even resulted in the relocation of municipalities despite the fact that they are 
cultural heritage areas, similarly to Cerro de Pasco in Peru. 
 
                                                        
4 The conflicts due to illegal mining are also present in Peru. For instance, there are severe socio-environmental 
impacts in the regions of Madre de Dios, Cusco, and Puno due to illegal alluvial mining (gold). These impacts 
increases radically after the construction of the IIRSA South highway that connects Brazil and Peru. 
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Figure 3. Environmental conflicts according to metabolic sector 
Source: MESOCA-ANCA Project (UNIVALLE) - EJATLAS (ICTA-UAB) 
 
The extraction of fossil fuels has become the second most conflict-generating activity (Figure 3), 
explaining 21% of the cases (61). In Ecuador, Bolivia and Colombia, this sector is responsible for 
28, 23 and 23% of cases, respectively (Figure 4)5. In Ecuador, there are many conflicts associated 
with this sector, generated by both multinationals and the state oil company (Petroecuador). We 
highlight the notable cases of pollution produced by Texaco-Chevron and the opening of the 
Eleventh Oil Round by the Ecuadorian government in 2012. In Bolivia, oil explorations located 
in or near protected areas such as Aguajare and Pilón de Lajas are noteworthy. In Colombia, 
fossil fuel conflicts are related to oil and coal, such as the exploration of oil in the territory of the 
U'wa indigenous community and the large scale open cast extraction and railway transport of 
                                                        
5 Although proportionally, there are many more projects of metal ores extraction (copper, gold, zinc, etc.) compared 
to fossil fuels extraction ones in Peru, the extraction of fossil fuels is also critical in this country (see: Orta-Martinez 
and Finer, 2010). The magnitude of socio-environmental impacts are huge considering the area of influence and the 




























nearly 80 million tons of coal per year by El Cerrejón in La Guajira and by Drummond in Cesar 
which strongly impact the environment of the country’s Atlantic Coast. 
 
Conflicts over biomass and land are also relevant. In the four countries studied, this sector 
generates 15% of the cases (45) analyzed. In Ecuador, they represent 24%; in Colombia, they 
represent 16%; in Peru, they represent 12%; and in Bolivia, they represent 8% (Figure 4). 
Biomass conflicts are primarily related to agro-export sectors: in Ecuador, they involve forest 
plantations (pine by the Profafor company and eucalyptus by the Eucapacific company), shrimp 
(in the provinces of Esmeraldas and Manabí), and flowers (in Pichincha). In Colombia, there are 
intensive monocultures of oil palm (in the Pacific and Atlantic coasts and Los Llanos in the East), 
cane for the production of sugar and ethanol (Valle del Cauca), forest plantations (Southwest) and 
wood exploitation (Chocó). A similar dynamic occurs in Peru, with the cultivation of oil palm in 
the Amazon (Loreto and Ucayali) and crops for export in Ica. In Bolivia, the intensive cultivation 
of quinoa in the departments of Oruro and Potosí and of soy in Santa Cruz are highlighted. 
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Figure 4. Environmental conflicts by country according to metabolic sector, Andean Region 
Source: MESOCA-ANCA Project (UNIVALLE) - EJATLAS (ICTA-UAB) 
 
Although material flow analysis leaves aside hydroelectric power, and also water as a material, 
there are important conflicts on water use and management, representing 13% (38) of cases 
(Figure 3)6.  Worldwide, many water conflicts arise from the growth of hydropower (Del Bene et 
al, 2018). The generation of hydropower has increased in the four countries analyzed by 11% 
annual average, going from 16,974 MW in 1970 to 110,475 MW in 2016. In Colombia from  
                                                        
6 Notice that water flows are not included in MFA, because they are one or two orders of magnitude larger than the 
MF. Notice also that a parallel Accounting of Energy Flows can and should be done to have a full picture of the 
Social Metabolism, but it is not done here for the sake of brevity. Production of electricity from coal, oil and natural 
gas is anyway indirectly reflected in the Material Flows, but not the electricity from water power (nor from wind 
power, or photovoltaic). There are many conflicts in AC because of hydroelectricity and also a few from wind 
energy - which are expressed as conflicts on land grabbing or land acquisition. 
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9.028 MW to 55.985, in Peru from 5.035 to 31.81, in Ecuador from 474 MW a 20.848 MW. In 
Bolivia it had a small decrease from 2.437 to 1.812 MW, perhaps explained by the rapid growth 
of natural gas extraction as a substitute source of energy (Source: OLADE-sieLAC, 
http://sielac.olade.org/consultas/tablero-evolucion-energeticos-flujos.aspx?or=605&ss=2&v=3).  
 
Water conflicts are very relevant in Bolivia, where water is responsible for 23% of the country's 
recorded conflicts. In Ecuador, Colombia and Peru, water is involved in approximately 12% of 
cases, largely because of the construction of new dams to generate energy. The most noteworthy 
water conflicts in Bolivia include the Water War in Cochabamba and the El Bala (Chepete) and 
Cachuela Esperanza hydroelectric plants, the largest of conflictive projects for export of 
electricity to Brazil; in Ecuador, the Baba Project, Hidrotambo, Rio Grande and Daule Peripa; in 
Colombia, El Quimbo, Urrá, Hidrosogamoso and Hidroituango and an important conflict for the 
construction of a supply system on the Pance River for the city of Cali (Pérez-Rincón et al, 
2014); and the dams on the Ocoña River, Sallca Pucará, and Santa Teresa II in Peru (Pérez-
Rincón et al, 2018). 
 
Other sectors, such as infrastructure, generate 5% (15) of the inventoried conflicts, where 
Colombia stands out with its construction of roads and ports for export. The waste management 
sector creates only 4% (11) of the total reported conflicts. These relate in particular to the 
location and management of landfills and, in the case of Peru, to mineral processing plants. Other 






3.2.2  Social impacts 
 
Environmental conflicts arise when a new economic activity interrupts the practices established 
in a territory, implying effects on resources, the ecosystem and the livelihoods and cultural 
parameters of the local populations. According to the EJAtlas, social impacts were identified 
according to the categories shown in Figure 5, which can be classified into material, immaterial, 
violent and other. One single conflictive project can have different events. The first group 
includes the deterioration of livelihoods, which is the primary cause of conflict (present in 245 of 
the 296 cases); the dispossession of land as a secondary effect (174 cases), along with the loss of 
food sovereignty (in 127 conflicts). Among the intangible impacts, the loss of cultural practices 
stands out, which is present in 198 of the 296 cases, along with the loss of cultural identity (100 
cases). The impacts associated with violence and human rights are also significant: displacement 
(159 cases), human rights violations (154), militarization (119) and violence (115). To a lesser 
extent, other types of impacts have been recorded, including corruption (139), specific impacts on 




Figure 5.  Main social impacts generated in conflicts 
Source: MESOCA-ANCA Project (UNIVALLE) - EJATLAS (ICTA-UAB) 
 
 
3.2.3  The groups affected and mobilized 
 
The environmental and social impacts of conflict-generating activities disproportionally burden 
specific groups of the population. According to the EJAtlas, these groups include people that 
engage in specific economic activities, including peasants, fishermen, company workers, artisanal 
miners and shepherds. They also include ethnic groups such as indigenous communities and 
Afro-descendant populations; groups that are related to the place where they live, such as the 
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In Figure 6, we can see the primary human groups affected. In one single conflict several groups 
may be affected. Peasants are present in 181 of the 296 cases analyzed7. The next most affected 
group is Indigenous communities, who are present in 162 cases. Urban inhabitants are present in 
139 conflicts; the total number of people affected in this group is larger because of its population 
density. Much of the damage to groups living in urban areas is transferred through environmental 
vectors (water, air) that shift impacts from the rural to the populated centers. These groups are 
followed by fishermen (67), company workers (41), artisanal miners (39), Afro-descendants (36), 
tourists (34) and pastoralists (29). 
When we consider the number of cases involving ethnic communities (indigenous and Afro-
descendant), a hypothesis of “environmental racism" in the region could be put forward (Bullard, 
1983, 1990). In 198 of the 296 cases of conflicts reported, either indigenous or Afro-descendant 
communities are affected. This is 66% of all inventoried cases, a ratio higher than for the EJAtlas 
as a whole and also higher than the proportion of such populations in the AC populations 
censuses. In Colombia, examples of affected indigenous communities include the Wayuú; the 
U'wa territory and the exploration of the Oxy; the Embera-Katio and the Urra dam, among others. 
In the case of the Afro communities, we highlight the exploitation of the forest in Bahía Solano, 
the exploration of hydrocarbons in San Andrés Islands, mining activity in Suárez and the Bajo 
Anchicayá hydroelectric plant. 
                                                        
7 In many cases, Andean peasants or “campesinos” (Quechuas, Aymaras, among others) must be included a part of 
the ethnic communities. Their agriculture livelihoods and cultural traditions are typically in conflict with large-scale 
mining projects. Moreover, there are (sometimes) discussions on the “indigenous status” of these communities in 
order to be included in the extractive projects (mining) consultations based on the 169 OIT Convention. 
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Figure 6. Main social groups affected 
Source: MESOCA-ANCA Project (UNIVALLE) - EJATLAS (ICTA-UAB) 
 
In Ecuador, the Achuar and Shuar indigenous communities are affected by the extraction of oil 
and there is also the issue of the Yasuní National Park, where indigenous populations such as the 
Tagaeri and Taromenane live in voluntary isolation. Similarly, Afro-Ecuadorian communities are 
affected, as in the case of shrimp farms in the Cayapas Mataje Ecological Reserve. In Peru, we 
see the involvement of the Achuar and Shuar indigenous communities in the oil exploration of 
Block 64 and deforestation for plantations in the territory of the Ashaninka community, and of 
course many indigenous communities affected by mining. In Bolivia the indigenous population 
are affected by projects such as the TIPNIS (Indigenous Territory and Isiboro Secure National 
Park) highway and the case of the El Bala (Chepete) hydroelectric dams in Madidi National Park, 


































3.2.4 Forms of mobilization or collective action 
 
The complaints of the affected groups are expressed in different forms of collective action. One 
single conflict can exhibit different forms of mobilization. They can be classified according to 
whether they are rather peaceful or use some degree of violence. Another classification could be: 
institutional or direct action. Most collective actions are rather peaceful and include sending 
letters or requests to institutions (present in 228 cases); protests, strikes and demonstrations 
(223); activism generated through the media (211); support from NGOs (187); lawsuits (113); 
objections to technical studies such as the EIAs (107) and alternative proposals (106). Actions 
related to the use of direct action even with some degree of violence by communities that resist 
extractive projects are presented to a lesser extent and include the occupation of land, buildings, 
public spaces and blockade of roads (54 cases), along with the explicit use of violence (use or 
threats of using weapons, damage to property, deliberate arson or sabotage) (51) (see Figure 7). 
 
In Colombia, the most visible resistance processes have been related to the rejection of large-
scale mining, oil extraction and hydroelectric projects. In gold mining, two conflicts are most 
famous: on the Santurbán paramo between the communities of the metropolitan area of 
Bucaramanga and the South African company Greystar (now Eco-Oro); and the conflict in La 
Colosa between the communities of Cajamarca and Piedras (Tolima) and the South African 
company Anglo Gold Ashanti. 
 
In the field of fossil energy, the most emblematic case is the previously mentioned oil exploration 
in the U'wa Territory by various oil companies (Oxy, Repsol and Ecopetrol). Among the conflicts 
involving dams, the following are highlighted: El Quimbo Hydroelectric in Huila and 
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Hidroituango in Antioquia. In these disputes, the resistance generated large social mobilizations 
and high levels of violence. Some cases resulted in legal actions that seek to stop such activities, 
including the Plebiscite for the Human Right to Water, popular referenda and the generation of 
citizen alliances such as the movement Ríos Vivos, which defends water ecosystems. 
 
  
Figure 7. Forms of mobilization in environmental conflicts in Andean countries 
Source: MESOCA-ANCA Project (UNIVALLE) - EJATLAS (ICTA-UAB) 
 
In Ecuador, mobilizations in 2005 required the cancellation of a contract with Occidental 
Petroleum, the immediate departure of the Brazilian company Petrobras from the Yasuní National 
Park and the cancellation of a contract that threatened the livelihood of the community of 
Sarayaku (Pastaza). The Plurinational March for Water, Life and Dignity of Peoples, held in 2012, 
opposed mega mining. Recently, mobilizations of rejection of the XI Round Oil are notable as 
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The summit of social mobilization in Peru occurred in 2008 and 2009. A set of legislative decrees 
known as “The Law of the Jungle” was passed. These decrees would allow 60% of the Peruvian 
Amazon forest to be granted to multinationals or sold for biofuel plantations under the 
government of Alán García. The result was the widespread mobilization of the indigenous 
population in the affected zone (Jiménez, 2009). The protest included the blockade of roads, 
bridges, an airport, two oil plants and some rivers. The participants belonged to 1,250 indigenous 
communities. During this mobilization, there were violent clashes that left many victims on both 
sides (Alimonda, 2015). After more than two weeks of protests, Congress was forced to repeal 
the legislative decrees (Alimonda, Hoetmer, & Saavedra Celestino, 2009).  
 
In the case of Bolivia, the most important movements have involved the privatization of water 
and other resources, including the 2000 Cochabamba case known as the "Water War" and the 
2003 "Gas War," which generated high levels of resistance and violence. 
 
3.2.5  Outcomes of environmental conflicts 
 
When activities disrupt a balanced relationship between society and the environment in a specific 
territory, collective actions are sometimes taken by communities that are affected. Communities 
structure resistance mechanisms to these projects to attempt to return to their initial situation. In 
response to these actions, or previously, corporations that lead the development projects also act 
offering compensation and attempting to divide communities. In many cases, corporations are 
backed by the government. These outcomes are listed in Figure 8. One single conflict can have 
different outcomes. Mechanisms to change or stop projects include legal tools (referendums, 
popular actions, prior consultations, environmental and health regulations and lawsuits), technical 
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instruments (challenges to environmental impact studies), media activism and visibility, court 
decisions, and the active participation of national or international Environmental Justice 
Organizations, human rights institutions and control authorities. Institutional instruments are 
often used. On the other hand, there is also a strong tendency in ACs to resolve conflicts or 
community demands through state violence (less in Ecuador and Bolivia than in Peru and 
Colombia). The aggregate of such violent situations represents 42% of the cases. In addition, 
there are mechanisms that are also of concern, such as corruption, which is present in 95 of the 
296 cases studied. 
 
  
Figure 8.  Outcomes of conflicts 
Source: MESOCA-ANCA Project (UNIVALLE) - EJAtlas (ICTA-UAB) 
(# Of events presented / Not exclusive) 
































The legal and institutional mechanisms most frequently used are in the form of regulations (140 
cases), negotiation (127) and compensation (70). There is a wide range of violent solutions to 
conflicts, including repression and militarization (92 cases), criminalization (91) and threats to 
activists (79).  In 25% (74) of the cases, there are displacements of the communities; in 20% (59 
cases), there are activist deaths, and in 5%, there are (15) disappearances. 
 
Colombia is the country that most often uses violence to resolve conflicts. In this country, 47% of 
the actions used correspond to violent mechanisms. Peru follows, with a rate of 41%; Bolivia has 
a rate of 34%; and Ecuador, 31%. Thus, in Colombia, in 34% of the conflicts, there is 
displacement, 25% involve deaths, and 12% involve disappearances. In Peru, these figures reach 
14% in displacements and a death rate similar to that of Colombia: 25%. Bolivia presents 
displacement situations in 38% of cases and deaths in 15%. Ecuador is the country with the 
lowest figures in this respect: in 10% of the cases, there are displacements, and in 7% of these 
cases, there are deaths. The number of cases involving deaths of environmental defenders is 
roughly confirmed by the reports from the NGO Global Witness (2016), which uses sources 
independently from the EJAtlas.  
 
One of the main objectives expected by the communities that resist the projects is that those 
projects will be stopped. The halting of such projects can be called "triumphs” or “successes” of 
environmental justice. They allow the communities to achieve a better distribution of 
environmental goods and services (distributive justice); the “success” cases might also exhibit 
expanded participation in decision-making (procedural justice) and improved recognition of 
cultural identity and human rights (recognition justice). Thus, communities are active in all the 
dimensions of environmental justice described by Schlosberg (2004).  
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Of the 296 conflicts inventoried in ACs, 59 projects have been stopped, resulting in a success rate 
close to 20%, which is similar to the overall rate in the EJAtlas to date (Table 1). Systematic 
research on the role of social actors active in conflicts and their networks (companies, EJOs and 
other civil society organizations, indigenous authorities, governmental organizations and courts 
of law, religious groups…) will be done in another article. Suffice here to signal the presence of 
CENSAT in Colombia8, Acción Ecológica in Ecuador, Conacami (National Confederation of 
Communities of Peru Affected by Mining) in mining conflicts in Peru, in many “successful” and 
also “unsuccessful” conflicts.  
 
Country  Total conflicts  
Total cancelled 
projects  
% Success rate 
 (a) (b) (b/total b) (b/a) 
Colombia 122 23 39.0% 18.9% 
Ecuador 58 12 20.3% 20.7% 
Peru 76 18 30.5% 23.7% 
Bolivia 40 6 10.2% 15.0% 
Total 296 59 100.0% 19.9% 
 
Table 1. Reported successes of Environmental Justice in Andean Countries 
Source: MESOCA-ANCA Project (UNIVALLE) - EJAtlas (ICTA-UAB) 
 
Peru is the one which presents the highest rate of success in stopping projects (23,7%), which 
corresponds to 18 cases out of which stand out the following: the Minera de Santa Ana project 
was stopped in 2011 by social protests which included blockages in the frontier with Bolivia, 
                                                        
8 CENSAT Agua Viva, representative of Friends of the Earth in Colombia. 
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marches towards Lima against damage to Lake Titicaca and to Aymara socio-cultural values; the 
Tía María project was stopped by the community which manifested its opposition through a 
popular consultation in Arequipa since it was affecting the zone’s water availability and 
agricultural production; the Tambogrande project was also stopped by another popular 
consultation which was the first in Latin America against gold mining. However, the most 
relevant achievement was the strike of the indigenous communities and road blockade which 
lasted over 60 days in La Bagua in Amazonia in 2009. As explained above, this ended up with 
large scale killing on both sides.  
 
The next in line is Ecuador with 12 stopped projects, which reach a success rate of 20,7%. The 
ones which stand out are the following: the lawsuit by the people of Sarayaku before the CIDH 
(Interamerican Commission on Human Rights) because of the exploitation of Block 23 within 
their territory without previous consultation; petroleum exploitation by Chevron-Texaco in which 
the multinational was sentenced in court to pay for the environmental damage to the Ecuadorean 
Amazon populations although it has not done so; the repeated instances of resistance in Intag 
against copper mining since the 1990s; the case of the indigenous communities against the 
patenting on the properties of the Croton lechleri by North American pharmaceutical companies. 
Also, the Puerto Ebano protests against shrimp farming stand out due to damage to the 
mangroves. 
 
In Colombia, the communal resistances have stopped 23 projects, reaching a success rate in our 
large sample of cases of 18,9%. The ones which stand out are Hacienda Las Pavas where 2.250 
ha were returned to landless farmers who resisted the attacks of oil palm cultivation; the urban 
dwellers resistance of Bucaramanga against gold exploitation in the Santurban moor; the struggle 
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of the U’wa people for their territory which was threatened by pressures brought forth by oil 
companies and the Colombian government; and the ones achieved through participatory 
mechanisms such as the triumphs associated to local referendums: Piedras (Tolima), municipality 
which rejected the gold-mining activity in its territory in 2013, a result which was backed up in 
2017 by the Cajamarca (Tolima) referendum. Both contribute to stop the implementation plans of 
Anglo Gold Ashanti in La Colosa gold mine. Tauramena (Casanare) did likewise regarding oil 
exploitation; and Cabrera (Cundinamarca) in February 2017 rejected the implementation of 
hydropower and mining projects within their territory. There is a ripple effect on popular 
consultations in Colombia in 2017, whose immediate cause is probably the political opportunity 
of the peace agreements and the stop of military action by guerrilla forces and the Army.9 
 
Finally, in Bolivia there are 6 success cases, a rate of 15%. There was a triumph related to water 
privatization in the city of Cochabamba; while gas privatization which resulted in strong protests 
repressed by the armed forces leaving behind 60 killed and 200 wounded. Against mining there 
are also successes as is the case of the stopping the Achachucani project in Challapata. 
 
There are then clear cases of “success” in achieving environmental justice. There are many other 
cases that do not reach such favourable results despite trying hard. Can they all be interpreted as 
examples of what has been called a potential alliance between two movements, global 
environmental justice and economic degrowth? (Martinez-Alier, 2012). Leaving fossil fuels and 
metallic minerals in the ground, stopping hydropower projects and deforestation, can be seen as 
                                                        
9 The popular consultation as a mechanism of resistance of the communities against extractivism in Colombia, has 
increased quite successfully in recent years. From 2011 to December 2017, 29 local initiatives were presented. Of 
these, 21 or were returned by regional courts or were deemed as not constitutional (for the time being) and 8 were 
effectively carried out with the participation of the official electoral authorities. All of them ended with rejection of 
mining, oil extraction or hydroelectric projects. 
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world relevant contributions from the Andean region to decreasing social metabolism worldwide, 
whatever the immediate local motivations. The protagonists might never have heard of the word 
“degrowth” or even of the word “ecology” but their practice if conducive to a less unsustainable 
world economy.  
4. DISCUSSION 
 
The ecological distribution conflicts in AC respond to the characteristics of these countries’ 
social metabolism. Compared to Europe, Japan, the United States or Argentina, the absence of 
nuclear power and nuclear conflicts is obvious, while the incidence of fossil fuels and metal 
mining conflicts is remarkable. Among the protagonist of such conflicts, peasant and indigenous 
population abound in the Andean countries (both in the uplands and in the Amazonian lowlands), 
often the victims of extreme racism for many centuries. In these countries, the reprimarization of 
their economies and the increase in “extractivism” was helped by the adoption of neoliberal 
policies associated to the “Washington Consensus” in the 1990s. The 1980s debt crisis had 
facilitated the imposition of adjustment policies, abandoning the path of industrialization started 
in the 1950s by CEPAL’s policies, invoking once again the traditional theory of comparative 
advantage so as to focus in producing and exporting commodities to the growing world market 
(Lander, 2014). This led economic activity towards natural resource-intensive goods, bursting 
into the traditional productive and cultural dynamics of the populations, giving rise to 
environmental conflicts throughout the AC. In the first decade of the 2000s, countries with 
neoliberal and also those with progressive government participated in a “commodities consensus” 
(Svampa, 2012, 2013, 2015). 
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The metabolic profile of a country or a region is defined by the structure of use of materials and 
energy linked to its economy (Krausmann, Fischer-Kowalski, Schandl, & Eisenmenger, 2008; 
Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 2015). This material structure is divided in the biotic and abiotic 
components. The first corresponds to agricultural, forest and fishing biomass, and the second one 
to fossil fuels, metal and non-metal mineral ores (Fischer-Kowalski, 2011: 153). When the 
material-energetic regime changes, society and its metabolism are altered, as well as the natural 
systems with which it interacts (Fischer-Kowalski, 2011). 
 
The results found in the AC show a region with extractive patterns which obey a transition 
towards an urban and exporter regime, focused on the exploitation of fossil fuels, non-ferrous 
ores such as gold, silver, copper and zinc for the external market, as well as the extraction of 
building materials for urban development and the required infrastructure for the strengthening of 
the internal and external markets. There is also increasing pressure on the biomass resources, for 
tree plantations and deforestation, and monocultures for exports, thus substituting export crops 
for food sovereignty; the development of the infrastructure has also grown for the strengthening 
of external markets and to accommodate the growing urban population. These sectors are also 
generators of environmental impacts.  
 
The material intensity in relation to the territory (domestic extraction per unit of surface, DE/km2) 
shows greater pressures in the abiotic sector than in the biotic. While the first went from 32 to 
212 tons/km2 (it multiplied by 6.8), the second one increased only from 58 to 91 tons/km2 
(multiplying itself by 1.6) between 1970 and 2012. A test for structural break carried out with 
Stata, shows that absolute materialization in terms of DE was not increasing constantly. A 
structural change was revealed for the region in 1999 triggering a higher level of materialization; 
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that is, there was an external political and economic clash which increased the rhythm of material 
growth. These were the policies favoring the extractive sector in the second half of the 1990s 
(Pérez Rincón, 2014), and the external demand. 
 
In this perspective, “materialization” of the AC, the shift in their metabolic profile and the 
policies for strengthening specialization towards the energy and mining sector that occurred at the 
end of the nineties of the previous century, became generators of strong environmental impacts 
and environmental unrest. That is, 73% (216 cases) of all the reported environmental conflicts in 
the AC started as of the year 2000 and following years. Out of these, 63% (136 cases) were on 
energy and mining. Likewise, of the 172 cases of conflicts inventoried in these two sectors 
(Figure 2), 78% (134) were generated from the year 2000 and following years (Pérez-Rincón et al, 
2018).  
 
There is a belief that the impacts generated by the projects are essentially material. Nevertheless, 
the results show that many have a relation to immaterial aspects, implying conflicts of values, 
interests and worldviews of the actors (Martinez-Alier et al, 1998). Environmental conflicts not 
only imply disputes over the control of goods and resources and over the distribution of the 
burdens of pollution, but they overlap with the distribution of power to generate and impose 
certain definitions of reality (Cardoso, 2018). As pointed out by Merlinsky (2013), the conflicts 
have cognitive and value aspects about the environment, involving both the material and 
symbolic objects of the dispute. Martinez-Alier (2002) denominates this as different, 
incommensurable “valuation languages” which emerge in many conflicts. The inclusion in the 
Constitutions of two AC countries (Ecuador, Bolivia) of new post-development, post-
extractivism and post-economic-growth concepts such as buen vivir or sumak kawsay, or the 
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notion of the “rights of nature”, are closely related to increased visibility of environmental 
conflicts. Such new concepts are also of political interest in Colombia and Peru, and indeed in all 
of Latin America (Vanhulst and Beling, 2014). Thus the reactions in the South against the effects 
of “extractivism” easily find a point of confluence with notions of post-growth or degrowth 
coming from the North.  
 
The different valuation languages are related to the sociocultural characteristics of affected 
groups, in its majority rural communities, which possess different forms to relate with the 
territories such as the indigenous people, afro-descendants and peasants. Notions of sacredness of 
nature or elements of nature are often found in such conflicts – certainly more often than 
“northern” notions of “voluntary simplicity”. The conflict-generating projects frequently produce 
violations to the right to life, health or autonomy. The loss of indigenous territorial rights, or the 
sacredness of elements of nature (a river, a lake), cannot be compensated by money. The lack of 
respect for local cultures and the disproportionate abuse of nature in indigenous territories could 
be called environmental racism (a word coming from the USA Environmental Justice movement 
of the 1980s) which corresponds to the fact that extractive activities or environmental impacts are 
located, with greater frequency, in areas where some ethnic groups dwell (Bullard, 1993, 1990). 
Such facts accord with current interpretations in terms of the persistence of a coloniality of power 
and a coloniality of knowledge (Quijano and Ennis, 2000).  
 
In terms of social movements, the indigenous and peasant populations, and the urban poor, are 
the social base for the “environmentalism of the poor” (Martinez-Alier, 2002). The defense of 
natural resources and culture on the side of the communities is manifest in various ways. The use 
of internet and other communication means becomes more important, as alternative media to 
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inform about the development of the conflicts. This has allowed the affected groups, as pointed 
out by Martinez-Alier et al. (2016), to build alliances with more powerful actors who can exert 
influence at different scales. At a local level, there are local scientists, NGOs, sympathizing local 
governments, religious groups and sometimes labour unions; and at higher scales, including the 
international level, alliances are developed with environmental or conservationist organizations 
from northern countries. This constitutes a growing global movement for environmental justice. 
 
The alliances with global actors and the increase of judicial tools or environmental justice 
activism (Merlinsky, 2013) have led sometimes to pacific resolutions of conflicts, after turning to 
new norms and institutions in order to try and find a solution to the conflicts. However, in the 
four AC under discussion, there have been a great number of violent outcomes against the 
communities such as forced displacement, repression, disappearances and deaths of 
environmental activists.  
 
When environmental justice successes are achieved there are reasons for celebration outside the 
immediate locality in the sense that there are clear diffusion effects. The vocabulary of resistance, 
the methods deployed (such as public consultations, Walter and Urkidi, 2015) travel from place 
to place and from country to country: ripple effects in the global environmental justice movement.  
 
However a limitation of the concept of “success” is evidenced. This is because, in practice, many 
of these achievements turn out to be temporary. The project can be paralyzed for some time and 
revive later, or it can be restarted by small companies in neighboring sites, using the strategy of 
renaming. Also, what can be considered as a triumph for some in a specific geographical space, 
can be a defeat for others in different places? Nevertheless, we must remember that 
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environmental conflicts are social processes and, in that perspective, they generate learning and 
empowerment of the communities, strengthening their capacity to resist and build more resilient 
and sustainable societies (Martinez-Alier et al, 2016). 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Biophysical or ecological economics highlights the growth and changes in the metabolic patterns. 
One general conclusion is that the many conflicts reported originate from the changes in the 
extractive economy of the region, specialized towards the primary sector as reflected in both 
monetary and metabolic terms.  
 
The four AC under study have experienced growth in the extraction of materials, and also in their 
export. The growth of the abiotic sector of the economy (mineral ores, fossil fuels) has been 
enormous. The metabolism of their economies (as measured by material flows) increased nearly 
four-fold between 1970 and 2012. Hydropower also increased. The current environmental 
liabilities around the world are a consequence of the quantity and structure of the metabolism in 
societies. In the AC this is evident. The impacts and the uncompensated liabilities are generators 
of conflicts. In some cases, economic compensation would not even be accepted. There are 
incommensurable values in dispute.  
 
Martinez-Alier et al (2010) explained that ecological distribution conflicts arise from the growth 
and changes in the social metabolism and that such conflicts are expressed in a variety of 
valuation languages. We have seen how this process takes place in four AC (Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Bolivia). We have analyzed a large sample of conflicts (roughly in proportion to the 
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respective population of the four countries) according to the metabolic sectors where they arise, 
the social impacts and affected groups, the forms of mobilization deployed in conflicts, and the 
triumphs of environmental justice or other outcomes of the conflicts.   
 
A policy for sustainability and the quest for environmental justice must focus on strategies to 
diminish material and energetic flows, limiting the expansion of the commodity extraction 
frontiers and changing the metabolic patterns. Respect for valuation languages expressed by 
indigenous communities could help in this strategy. On the contrary, we see in all four countries a 
continuous march towards the “commodity extraction frontiers” driven often by external trade 
demands despite the many protests and even new bottom-up institutions such as the local 
referendums or public consultations. 
 
The AC’s governments have wagered on increasing the energy and mining sectors and 
monocultures for exports, regardless of the inclination of governments towards right or left. 
These strategies are of a lose-lose-lose nature because of the environment loses, the economic 
loses (as prices go down because of over supply) and also the societal loses. Indebtedness 
increases when export prices go down, and this leads to more pressure for increasing the volume 
of exports and causing a further deterioration of prices (Samaniego et al, 2017). There is evidence 
that extractivism leads countries to a specialization trap, where growth of socio-environmental 
liabilities is larger than the new economic assets. 
 
Many ecological distribution conflicts originate from the extractive dynamics of the region's 
economy. As we have seen, an inventory of 296 main ecological distribution conflicts contained 
in the EJAtlas (122 in Colombia, 58 in Ecuador, 76 in Peru and 40 in Bolivia) corroborates this 
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relationship. This inventory allows the following conclusions: extractivism causes many conflicts 
related to mining, fossil fuels, hydroelectricity, biomass and fossil energy; indigenous, Afro-
descendant, indigenous and peasant communities are the most affected; behind the conflicts, 
there are not only environmental impacts but also significant social impacts that are both material 
(affecting livelihoods, land and water deprivation and work insecurity) and immaterial (loss of 
cultural practices and cultural identity); most of the forms of collective action used by 
communities are peaceful, most notably, petitions, street marches, media activism, lawsuits while 
States and companies are sometimes violent (with about 75 cases of death or disappearance of 
environmental defenders); and finally, grassroots social movements (that sometimes include 
environmental NGOs) have experienced relative success, stopping 20% of the 296 projects that 
caused conflicts.  
We conclude that the post-growth perspective has a “substantial number of potential 
contemporary allies in the global South” (Gerber and Raina, 2018). New concepts have been 
developed at national scales (such as post-extractivism) which are close to post-growth or 
degrowth or “prosperity without growth” in rich countries in the North. In the South (and in the 
Andean Countries) such concepts do not arise from theoretical meditations or from the practice of 
small neo-rural or squatting communities (as often in the North). They are born from the 
livelihood struggles of large populations, which are subject to exploitation, to racism and to 
internal and external colonialism.  
While stopping single extractivist projects cannot be construed as a general critique of economic 
growth, such attempts are congruent with post-development, community-centric, ecologically-
balanced and culturally-sensitive Andean visions such as buen vivir or sumak kawsay.  They are 
also congruent with policy proposals put forward from a post-economic growth perspective such 
as “leaving unburnable fuels in the ground” and “resource extraction caps”. 
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The school of anti-extractivism or post-extractivism in Latin America (Eduardo Gudynas, 
Maristella Svampa) might not be favourable to the use of the word degrowth for the 
mobilizations they are analyzing and promoting (Kallis, 2018) but they are clearly favourable to 
slowing down drastically the extraction and exporting of cheap commodities, i.e. “degrowth in 
practice” (Kallis, 2018). 
Ecological distribution conflicts can be seen as reinforcing therefore the impulse towards 
environmentally and socially friendly economies worldwide. The strategies for sustainability can 
be oriented towards technical changes and appropriate public policies but they should also be 
oriented to support civil society movements which already exist, strengthening of communities 
resilience, the environmentalism of the poor and the indigenous, and the global movement for 
Environmental Justice, since these promote ways of life which are better balanced with the 
environment. Grassroots “post-extractivism” is a South American idea born or reinforced by so 
many ecological distribution conflicts. It is addressed to the whole world, and it is not less 
relevant for ecological economists than Degrowth, a Steady State Economy, or Prosperity 
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